Daniel Larson:
Hello everyone. Thank you for joining us today. I see that people are filing into the room here, and so welcome to today's virtual faculty in the field, professor Alain Lempereur, it's really a pleasure to have all of you here and it's a pleasure for us to have Alain give us part of his day for this presentation.
Daniel Larson:
Today we will be having an opportunity to also ask questions to Alain after his presentation, so if you have a question, please indicate as such in the chat box and after the presentation, we will unmute you so you can ask your question verbally to Alain, and again, because we just have a certain amount of time, we may not get to everyone's questions today, but again, please feel free to input your questions there. And, if you encounter any technological issue, you can reach out to tech support in the chat box as well.
Daniel Larson:
So with that, I will pass it off to Ana Lobo and her International Business School MBA class of 2012 who will introduce Professor Lempereur. Ana?
Ana Lobo:
Thank you, Daniel. Welcome. I am Ana Lobo, co-president of the Alumni Club of Toronto and a member of the alumni association board of directors. I'm a 2012 graduate of the Brandeis International Business School. Professor Lempereur was originally planning to come to Toronto to speak at a faculty in the field event. It would have actually taken place this coming weekend, and while we're not able to hold an in-person event, we are thrilled that he quickly agreed to present a virtual event. And that we have the opportunity to share this event with alumni, parents, Brandeis National Committee members and friends literally all around the world. Thanks to all of you for coming together for this program.
Ana Lobo:
And now, to introduce our speaker, Professor Alain is the Alan B. Slifka professor at Brandeis and the director of the Heller School's Conflict Resolution and Coexistence Program. He is an affiliated faculty and executive committee member of the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. He also supports the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and the Geneva-based Center of Competence on Humanitarian Negotiations. He is a consultant for the international committee of the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders. We're excited to welcome him to the virtual event space and look forward to learning from him today. Thank you Professor Alain.
Alain Lempereur:
Thank you so much, Ana. Thanks Daniel for organizing this online event. Well, I wish I had been with you in Toronto, but it's also good to see so many of our friends who are joining us from all over the world. I was looking at the list of people who are joining us today and I thank my colleagues, Mary Fizter from Ireland, to Pamina who I think is now in Columbia. My friend Ricardo Eugencogen, Mary, I have Pierre DeBatiff from Brussels and also a lot of former friends and students... Current friends and former students in the field. Wonderful people who are working for the ICRC or MSF or the Norwegian Refugee Council, whether it's Hannady, Jerome, or Julie.
Alain Lempereur:
I've also seen so many wonderful people that I met, for example at a Brandeis event in London, a woman. And I remember her name very well because she has exactly the same name as my mother, so how could I not remember her? Her name is Jean Sampson. Believe it or not, when I saw... My mother is even attending this event through Jean, that was a fantastic opportunity.
Alain Lempereur:
So, let me share my screen with you and introduce you to the topic of today which is what can we learn from the humanitarian negotiation, and in particular what can we learn from how the Red Cross negotiates in the frontline.
Alain Lempereur:
Let me start with a little pop quiz. And I know that probably all of you will answer these questions easily, but let me try. So, I will ask you, well, do you know before this talk, are you familiar with Henri Dunant? Are you familiar with A Memory of Solferino? Yes, or no? Are you familiar with the Geneva Conventions? Yes or no? And last questions. Have you heard of humanitarian negotiation before this talk? I'll let you submit your answer to that quiz and Daniel will give us... I'm also supposed to answer that question. So as the person organizing this, I'll submit my own answers. Where are we Daniel? Daniel, can you tell us where we are sitting?
Daniel Larson:
Yes. We are having results coming in right now. We have a little over 60% of the participants who have voted so far. We'll wait a few more seconds once the results are coming in, and then we'll share it with everyone.
Alain Lempereur:
Fantastic. So we will look at what you answered. But as we have a very learned audience, I'm pretty sure we will have a lot of yeses to these questions. But let me link these four pictures for you. One way of linking them is putting in the center of the picture, the Geneva Conventions. Oh, well, that's good to know. So many of you don't know about Henri Dunant, so I hope you will learn about him today. And many of you don't know, even more of you don't know about a book called The Memory of Solferino. So that's a book I hope that many of you will read after this talk. Many of you know the Geneva Conventions, which is good news 93%. And you're saying you're familiar with humanitarian negotiation and that's a surprise to me.
Alain Lempereur:
But so, maybe you will learn from this little presentation. Let me go back and link these four pictures for you. One way of linking them is to start with the Geneva Conventions. And consider that the three other pictures whether it's Henri Dunant the founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross, or the book he wrote A Memory of Solferino, or the current humanitarian negotiators revolve around these Geneva Conventions. Conventions that have been put together to protect the wounded, the civilians, the prisoners of war.
Alain Lempereur:
So one way of looking at this is to see the law as the center of the humanitarian universe. That's what I would call lego-centrism. But what if we saw the world slightly differently. And we put the humanitarian negotiators, those frontliners in the center of a picture, of the universe of humanitarian action. And then we could see that maybe someone like Henri Dunant was a negotiator, and he wrote a book as a strategy to actually get the conventions done so that they could be stronger negotiations. This is what I would call nego-centrism, which is that maybe negotiation is the center of the humanitarian universe.
Alain Lempereur:
I'm telling you, this difference between, is it the law that is the center for humanitarian action, or is it negotiation that is very important in making things happen? Well, my hope is that through this talk, you will have more answers to these questions.
Alain Lempereur:
So let me start with a quote that identified already many years ago that in parallel with this attempt to codify humanitarian work... Well, the early International Committee of the Red Cross was using, leveraging these delegates to negotiate access to the war wounded, and also to assist in relief and protective actions. They were lobbying the states in such a way that through treaties like the Geneva Conventions, they would have an instrument to negotiate more effectively.
Alain Lempereur:
But you see there is this idea that if you want to negotiate more effectively in the field, you need probably some legal instruments, but you also need negotiation to put these legal instruments in place. And sometimes the negotiation in the front line will feed the law and the Geneva Conventions as we will see. So let me start with these four cases from the one who is probably the oldest one, Henri Dunant, the founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross that I will call the mobilizer, John Rabe, who is an organizer of the International Safety Zone in Nanking in 1937. Marcel Junod very well known International Committee of the Red Cross delegate that I will call the pusher but also talk more about the current frontliners. So, let me and that should take us about 30 minutes and then we will have about 20 minutes for questions and answers.
Alain Lempereur:
Let me start with Henri Dunant. If I had to summarize what he is, I summarized him as a negotiator, as resource mobilizer. We need to revisit the Battle of Solferino that happened on the 24th of June, 1859. And it's a war, it's a battle like many others. You have two leaders, two heads of states, three heads of states actually, two Emperor's, one king and it's a butchery. It's a butchery, about 330,000 soldiers are involved, and 40,000 casualties. And you have Henri Dunant who happens to be there. I'm telling you, he happens to be there, because he's a businessman. He's working in Algeria, and he wants to see the Emperor just to negotiate some favors. But he sees what's happening. He's a witness. And, as you will see, he will negotiate a lot on the battlefield. And that's probably the primordial scene for humanitarian action, and also for humanitarian negotiation.
Alain Lempereur:
Because what happens? Well, he arrives during the aftermath of this battle, and what does he see? Well, he sees all of these people, these people dead, the corpses laying down, the people dying, the wounded, the thirsty, the starving. These soldiers were not supposed to meet in the battlefield that day. So they hadn't eaten, they had only had a cup of coffee. And he sees them after the battle was won by the French, and the Italians that they're abandoned. These glorious soldiers, officers, now they are just left behind.
Alain Lempereur:
So he assesses the situation and the needs and he realizes that he needs to negotiate. He need to negotiates because he needs to involve for example, some French authorities, tourists that are coming, passing by there and he will even go and involve a countess from Geneva because he will tell her what's happening, he'll write to her and ask her to do some fundraising so that by the next few days, they will be more means to alleviate the suffering of people, he will trigger humanitarian impulse. He will also summon the woman of a village nearby called Castiglione. You see the little church where many of the people ended up being put, because there was no other place. And the woman will have these formula that became famous Tutti Fratelli, we are all brothers and sisters. It doesn't matter if you're Australian, Italian or French, we will take care of everyone. And we will alleviate suffering, and we will stay engaged as much as necessary to make sure that people recover.
Alain Lempereur:
This is what I've called the SANITAS framework. You need to negotiate, it's central to see what's happening, to assess the situation, to inquire and inform about what's happening but also inform people of what's happening. Make sure you convince people and trigger in them the humanitarian impulse, alleviate suffering and stay engaged. SANITAS, it means health in Latin.
Alain Lempereur:
And, I just took a more data of what was happening in two hospitals nearby where all of these wounded were brought, many hospitals, many recovered, some died. And all of these surgeries that were put in place, they are also to overcome tetanus cases, typhus cases. And if I'm telling you about Brescia, it's because you probably have heard of what's happening at the moment in Lombardy and Veneto, or at least what was happening during the last month, because Solferino it's in north of Italy. And that's exactly kind of the same scene. You really need to have more ambulances involved, you need the support of volunteers, you need to create hospital tents, attend to the wounded and the dead, and get more resources. So that's the same story that you need to negotiate to mobilize resources.
Alain Lempereur:
And what was true in 1859 in the battlefield is still true in the battle against the Coronavirus in the exact same place. So, Henri Dunant was a negotiator and a mobilizer, and we saw how he was in Solferino in the frontline, but you can also see that he will use that book, A Memory of Solferino to be an advocate, to tell about the horrors of war and he will in his book, he's formidable because he makes the people who are dying or wounded talk. And what are they saying? We need water, we need support, we don't want to die or if we die, at least we want to contact our families.
Alain Lempereur:
So you see, what we're seeing through what's happening in 1859 is so similar to what we're seeing in the field right now. But through that book that he will send around and in particular to the heads of states of Europe, you will build a high level coalition to create a permanent body that will become the Red Cross. He will be involved in summoning a conference in 1863, where 13 countries will send their representatives and it will lead to the first Geneva Convention and that's the birth of the Red Cross Committee and the Red Cross Societies will be the American Red Cross, The Italian Red Cross etc. And it will immediately, these conventions will immediately be used and implemented again in the frontline, for example, for a war that is happening the next year.
Alain Lempereur:
Let me summarize on Henri Dunant. He makes these needs assessment, he sees for example, how exhausted the few surgeons are, and they are so exhausted that they faint. And one was only able to continue his operations because he was supported by two soldiers. So, what he says we need more resources and on the battlefield, you will go and talk to the Marshal MacMahon and say to him, I mean, you have these Austrian doctors who are prisoners, please let us use them, because we need them for the wounded whoever they are, and that commander will authorize him, and that will be a way of helping the overwhelmed French colleagues. Henri Dunant for sure a visionary, for sure the founder of the Red Cross, but first he was a negotiator in the front line, and also as a resource mobilizer.
Alain Lempereur:
Let's talk to a second case, John Rabe. John Rabe, not very well known. I see him as an organizer. And we need to transport ourselves in Nanking. Nanking is a city in 1937. That is the capital of nationalist China. About one million people live there, but the Japanese have invaded through Shanghai, and they know that Nanking is next. So you will have refugees about 500,000 people will flee the city. You will have about 300,000 people who will be massacred at that time, and you could always read the book by Iris Chang about what has been called The Rape of Nanking. But what I want to focus on is these 250,000, 200,000, who will be saved by John Rabe who will be a leader as negotiator and organizer.
Alain Lempereur:
John Rabe that you see here was actually the CEO of Siemens in China. He is German, and he will be chosen to head international safety zone committee. And you see all the people who are involved here, very international, and they will create these international safety zone even without the agreement of Geneva. They say that's the only way of saving the people who need a safety zone. So you see the safety zone is just a part of Nanking at the time. They will use the Red Cross flag all over the zone to protect it against attacks, and if today you go to Nanking, you could still visit the University of Nanking. John Rabe's house, because it's a little miracle in the massacre that 200,000 people will be saved.
Alain Lempereur:
And how will they be saved? Well, through the usual pillars of responsible negotiation, they will have to engage people, solve problems and facilitate an effective process. How do they engage people? I told you, John Rabe is already working with a strong leadership team, but he's also working with Minnie Vautrin another wonderful person of that committee who is the Dean of Ginling College, who is a surgeon like Robert Wilson, a monument was just unveiled in Southern California by his daughter that you see on the right of the picture here.
Alain Lempereur:
And also Cheng Ruifang who is one of the Chinese staff personnel. So you see there is an entire Chinese international team put in place. And if you look at these international cities on the committee, but also International Committee of the Nanking Red Cross, you see that it's organized by functions. They want to make sure people attend to food, to shelter, to the management of properties, and that's the dedicated group that will protect 250,000 people. It's a strong organization put in place, there is an organization chart, division of labor, hierarchical functions, problem solving mechanism, anticipating them through need assessment, but also an alert system. If any Japanese soldier would come in by any place, there would be a warning that would be sent to the center so that an international person could come and support or so. They are very responsive, very creative, and sometimes even summoning outside help to solve problems.
Alain Lempereur:
They're also doing policymaking. They don't have any choice, they need to negotiate with both the Chinese authorities at the beginning that there would be no anti aircraft barriers, for example, in the zone, but also with the Japanese authorities all the time. So that all the bodies that are lying down on the streets will be taken away. They will also have a lot of internal negotiating.
Alain Lempereur:
So that's who is on I would say the bright side. On the other side, there are a lot of negotiation going on with the perpetrators. Humanitarian negotiation is that you need to negotiate with people you don't like to negotiate with. For example, the commander of the forces stationed in Nanking, Matsui who will be tried in Tokyo after the war and be executed.
Alain Lempereur:
Another prominent actor, the prince Yasuhiko Asaka because he's part of the Imperial Household will not be tried and condemned after the war, but these were very hard people to work with.
Alain Lempereur:
What are the problems that they need to face? I told you, John Rabe is an organizer. And these are the words of John Rabe. Before even the Japanese arrived in the city, he had listed everything they had to be ready for. That's all the functions that he had identified. So, you see, it's not frontline negotiation is not about good intentions. We already saw that it's about resource mobilization with Henri Dunant. But it's also mostly about organizing, organizing yourself and making sure that perpetrators give you the license to operate.
Alain Lempereur:
And John Rabe will leverage all kinds of sources of power. First is incredible sense of purpose. Why are you doing what you're doing? And he explains that all the time because I want to help the poorest of the poor, as he calls them, the most vulnerable. We need to show a sense of humanity, he says. We need also to apply the Geneva Conventions, we need to attend to the needs of the most vulnerable, we need to sometimes use relationship. You will send a card to the Japanese for Christmas. You will also use culture, you will invoke the honor of the samurai. You will sometimes even leverage their interests, sometimes even power trying to use the power of legitimacy, but also the power maybe of the diplomats. But you see you take anything it takes to be more convincing.
Alain Lempereur:
A process. What is an ongoing process and a process that takes place? From the beginning stage, the planning stage, there is a lot of planning and pre-positioning. Also, at the operation stage when you implement the mission but also adjust it to the circumstances. And for the exit stage, when it's up to closing the mission. Humanitarian negotiators, they have to interact all the times but also at all levels. At the highest level, with for example, Chiang Kai Shek, the highest national leader of the time, but also with the commanders who are positioned in Naiking and even with the soldiers in the streets. And that's still the same case today for frontliners.
Alain Lempereur:
Here's a telegram that he sends, John Rabe sends, "Food question, we need these 50,000 tons. Request was turned down, please try negotiation in Shanghai, buy green beans. Why buy green beans? Because there is an epidemic of Beriberi. That they really need green beams and go ahead and raise funds and we will find ways of using that." You see, that's resource mobilization, but also organization. And somehow the fact that he is a businessman, he had been there with Siemens for about 30 years could explain why he was so well organized in all of his negotiations.
Alain Lempereur:
If you want to know more about, John Rabe there's a movie that came out in 2009. There are some historical inaccuracies, but globally, as you could see with the picture on the upper left, these are the negotiation going on between the Red Cross frontliner and some of the authorities and you see here the guy playing Robert Wilson negotiating with a soldier at gun point. This is what frontline negotiation is.
Alain Lempereur:
Let me move to Marcel Junod and I will say that's a negotiator as a global pusher. He was a globetrotter, I'm telling you. Just look at the map of where he had these different missions. He started in 1935 during the war that was taking place in current Ethiopia with the Italians. Then he moved between 1936-1939 to Spain, to Poland, France, Germany and England, and even went to negotiate in Greece, with the Soviet Union, with Japan and with the US. So he is probably the embodiment of what will be more and more the case for the ICRC delegates. There are intercultural negotiators, they really need to adjust to different contexts. And there is again, the book that Marcel Junod has written, you see the learning curve.
Alain Lempereur:
You could find him a little naive or awkward in his first missions, but then he clearly improves his own techniques. With my students, I use this framework and I won't go through the details of all of these elements because they vary from one case to the next. That if you want to prepare for negotiation, and be structured in terms of meetings, you need to have a clear purpose, know what the kind of problems need to address, who will be on your side, who is on the other side, etc, who could be your partners, the kind of process moves you can undertake, principles to uphold, planning of all of these, the places where you negotiate and the deliverables you expect. These are the eight P's I use for students, even for any kind of negotiation.
Alain Lempereur:
And so I won't go into the details of how the students apply because they're so wonderful. Look, for example, they identified in each of these places, what Marcel Junod did, the kind of problems of all type that they have to face, who is involved in the different cases. The kind of principles that are also upheld more or less in each of these situations.
Alain Lempereur:
Let me maybe summarize what I see also with Marcel Junod in all of his missions, and it's one of my students who made me aware of this. In fact, Marcel Junod sometimes he will have to negotiate less than what the law entitles him to, less than what the law demands. Examples of that. Well, he should see all the prisoners of war detained by the Japanese, for example. But they deny that access to all of them. So at least he would have to negotiate down. And can I see at least one and maybe he will not have a lot of time but at least he will see one.
Alain Lempereur:
He should try to protect and save all the prisoners of wars or hostages. Well, that will be a hard one, nearly impossible. But at least he will start with two and maybe when he has two, maybe he can go for 10 and 10. That's what he does during the war, the civil war in Spain, he only start with an exchange of hostages of one and one and then it becomes 10 and 10, and even 130 at some point. But sometimes he will negotiate more than what the law demands, more than what the rights and mandate entitle him to.
Alain Lempereur:
Let me give you an example. Before the Second World War and during the Second World War, civilians were not protected by the Geneva Conventions, therefore not protected by law. But what? Does that mean that we need to let the Greek starve? No, you will negotiate up that we should do something about the starving Greeks. Or for example, the Russians have not signed the Geneva Convention. So they are not protected. All these PoW's are not protected. Again he will negotiate up and he said can I visit them? And he will convince the German officer of the camp to let him in.
Alain Lempereur:
So you see, he will negotiate more or less than what the law demands, but he will negotiate all the time and wherever he starts, it will always try to get more and increase the scope of protection. Let me give you an example. An amazing case of the crisis in Greece that happened during the winter of 1941, '42. The Germans have invaded Greece, and the winter of 1941, '42 is terrible. And I'm sorry for the next picture. But that's also this picture that made people move and made people do what they had to do.
Alain Lempereur:
So look at, for example, the telegram that an ICRC delegate Robert Brunel sent to Geneva. The situation in Greece, extremely grave, mortality increased six fold, catastrophe inevitable unless outside help arrives quickly. And it's not a very well known famine. There was an exhibition recently about it, but Marcel Junod, thanks to Robert Brunel's push will have to negotiate both with the Lord of Admiralty in London, but also with the Prish Marine and other Nazi leaders in Berlin to make sure that what and believe it or not a Turkish boat, called the Kurtulus will actually sail to Greece and Athens and save many starving Greeks.
Alain Lempereur:
There is even, it's free, you could find it on YouTube, a little video called the steamship that carried Peace and you have some survivors explaining how the Turkish Red Crescent saved the Greeks. Powerful story. So Marcel Junod will negotiate the scope of humanity, up or down, down when he has no other choice, but up again and more. You see, the law is just a springboard sometimes, you need to get more than what the law requires. And you could do that how? Through negotiation. There is a documentary that I would like to show to my students at Brandeis we are negotiating this with the producer of that movie.
Alain Lempereur:
Frontline negotiators are global pushers. Here is what for example, Moorehead writes in her book Dunant's Dream. In Greece, it was to become clear across occupied Europe, like everywhere. It's up to the individual delegate to negotiate. And those who push the hardest were often those who won the most concessions. So it's paradoxical, right? You need to be highly competitive as a humanitarian negotiator because you need to get things done. Much of the international community of success came down to courage and determination. Brunel like Marcel Junod who was a pusher and among the men who followed him or woman copied his behavior.
Alain Lempereur:
So that brings us to our first case of the Frontliners Today. And I will call them the negotiator as learners. I was really struck in a meeting in 2015 when I talked to a person who became a very good friend of mine, who said, ICRC delegates have never been debriefed about their negotiation. I said, "What?" "No, they are not." So with the help of [inaudible 00:34:37] and her team, over 100 interviews were led with current and former delegates. There was a database put in place, a review of literature, and collaboration with both practitioners and academics peer to peer exchanges, to understand and learn about how they do it. The same way we learn about Henri Dunant.
Alain Lempereur:
What did we learn from these interviews? Well, a lot of negotiation of humanitarians is about access to detainees, internally displaced people and all the other topics you see at the bottom there. They also have to face problems that we know about. Sometimes they say they are dealing with parties or they seem that look irrational to them, or find, or ICRC suspicious, right? So many people who are they negotiating with? Who are their counterparts for the humanitarian negotiators? Well, national government, Non State Armed Groups, NASG, foreign governments, etc. What are the enablers for humanitarians? What are the process moves?
Alain Lempereur:
For sure, the fact that you have the Red Cross because of all these societies and the Red Crescent, because of their presence in the field, well, that's certainly an enabler, but also sometimes the environment that could help them move. They negotiate everywhere, no doubt and you're not surprised by that. And what are their products and solutions that they get out of this? Well, they will do airlift, they will negotiate civilian evacuations or food delivery by helicopters.
Alain Lempereur:
So what did we learn from all of this, is that we had to create an inter-agency forum that became the center of competence on humanitarian negotiation. It's a Geneva based center. And what the good news it's a coordination of five humanitarian partners who work together in the circle of humanitarian action. What are the missions of that center? They really want to learn from the frontline negotiators and also to help these frontline learn by being more aware of their work, by developing frameworks adjusted to the context and by creating a community of practice.
Alain Lempereur:
What do we hope that these frontline negotiators will learn? They will be more conscious about what they're doing. They will be more competent, better prepared, more confident in themselves, more connected with each other, more aligned, but also sometimes more prudent when it's about relationship with counterparts. They will be principled but also will learn to manage dilemmas, creative, as creative and impactful as possible in terms of solution, astute and context aware, competitive sometimes with states and non state armed groups and for sure resilience.
Alain Lempereur:
So if I had to summarize four cases about the frontline negotiators, no doubt that frontline negotiation for humanitarians is pervasive at the Red Cross, one key purpose, saving lives, protecting lives and many ways of getting that done, many problems to overcome, you need to negotiate internally, externally at all times, in all places, at all levels, in all manners of moves.
Alain Lempereur:
That is very well captured already 25 years ago. The Red Cross by the nature of its objective is necessarily involved in war situation, but it could say in any disaster situation. It's leaders, members, delegates are in direct contact, in permanent negotiation with the leaders in charge of the war. And what did we learn about the ICRC frontline negotiator? We learned from Henri Dunant, the mobilizer that we really need to bring everyone together for the purpose of saving lives. We also learn from John Rabe that you need to be a negotiator. As organizer, you need to be a pusher as Marcel Junod and other delegates during the war proved, and as the current humanitarian negotiators do. All the time you need to learn from what you're doing and get better at doing it.
Alain Lempereur:
If you want to know more about the topics, I know some of you may want to read The Memory of Solferino. If you are interested in John Rabe don't hesitate to read The Good Man of Nanking. And if you are interested in Marcel Junod, don't hesitate to read Warrior Without Weapons. And that's it, my friends for the time being and I will stop sharing the screen and open the floor to questions.
Daniel Larson:
Thank you so much, Alain. We actually have a question here from Yun Chen. Yun Chen I'm going to unmute your mic and allow you to ask your question for Professor Lempereur. Go for it.
Alain Lempereur:
Yun Chen, yes. I think I don't hear well.
Daniel Larson:
Yeah. Well, for some reason we can't hear their question.
Alain Lempereur:
I think I see it. It's, Yun Chen, you asked, how come the safety zone was not invaded by the Japanese? This is a good question, right? And you could ask the same question for why some of the safe houses in Budapest that some of the neutral powers along Waldenburg, Quaaludes and others were not invaded by the Nazis during the war.
Alain Lempereur:
One possible explanation is that it was headed by an International Committee. And in that committee, they were Germans, Americans, and the Japanese did not want at that time at least to piss them off too much. I think that's probably one explanation. Did the Japanese protect the safety zone at all times? Absolutely not. So they were incursions but because they were incursions, and because there was an alert system put in place someone like John Rabe or other members of the committee would come and say, "We are the Red Cross. You're not supposed to do this." And that's also true for Waldenburg or other diplomats who were involved in humanitarian actions during the Second World War.
Alain Lempereur:
It is not perfect protection, and John Rabe sometimes see the safety zone as being very unsafe. And you could say that the same for the safe houses in Budapest in 1944. They were not highly safe, but they were the best possible protection.
Daniel Larson:
We have a question here from David Phillips. David, I'm going to add you in here to talk, so-
Alain Lempereur:
Hi David.
David Phillips:
My question is, I did a lot of research about this in the archives of the ICRC in Geneva. During World War II, they basically accepted the German position that the concentration camps were not part of their business at all. They came down very strongly except for a brief visit to [Teresa Stott 00:42:49]. There was a lot of anti-Semitism in the organization, and at the time, the highest reaches of the ICRC were somewhat synonymous with the Swiss government.
David Phillips:
And at least something I read was to the effect that it was the Swiss government that influenced the Germans to put Jews on passports so that they would know who to turn away at the borders. There was one person in the ICRC in particular, in the legal division, that very strongly took the position that we have nothing to do with the concentration camps. And he later when some Swiss historians confronted him with it on TV, he disappeared. He basically left without trying to answer the question.
David Phillips:
The film of that TV has disappeared from the archives, which was very strange to an archivist there who told me about the whole thing. Anyway, I wonder if you could talk about this because this was in my judgment, an extraordinary failure, and it was influenced by anti-Semitism.
Alain Lempereur:
David I think that somehow I prepared this question you could imagine, right? And this is a stain in the history of the International Committee of the Red Cross. And you know, if you read this book by Caroline Moorehead, and I'm sure you read it. But in that book, the introduction of the book, is about this meeting on the 14th of October 1942 where you have 19 men and four women who will decide whether or not there will be a public appeal denouncing what at that time they know is happening in concentration camps. And it's still, I mean, the same way you have in January 1942, the early negotiation in advance conference. What is happening on the 14th of October 1942 is frightening. And yes, you're absolutely right, the head of state of Switzerland came to that meeting too. And its neutrality. You saw, for example, that in Greece, the ICRC actually protected the Greeks.
Alain Lempereur:
But in this case, the arguments that were used are very weak. They said, "Well, we know if we speak up, we will not be able to be involved with the PoW's anymore. And yes, this is the legalistic argument. Well, it's not part of our mandate because civilians are not protected. But that's why I'm saying, if you realize that your mandate is not appropriate you need to craft your mandate as a responsible negotiator, you need to go beyond your mandate. There is a consensus that Moorehead makes at the end of her description of that meeting. And because we have the minutes of what everyone said, she says there is consensus today that if they have spoken publicly, it's not clear it would have changed what the Germans and the Nazis were doing in the extermination camps, but it is also not sure that they would not have had access to the PoW's.
Alain Lempereur:
So I think that if they had spoken up, they would have probably saved if not their legal position, their moral high ground that saw up to that moment in the history of the Red Cross had never been so much at risk. So I think that thanks for bringing that, Dennis because I think that that's the other side of the picture.
Alain Lempereur:
And there is a quote from Burkhardt that are often tell my students about. Because one of the delegates said, "Well, you know, what should we do? We have a lot of people who ask for help?" And Burkhardt to say, "Well, whatever you do for the Jews do it but don't say it, don't talk about it." And you know these don't ask, don't tell policy or this approach that is based on confidentiality, sometimes has its limits. And that explains why an organization like Doctors Without Borders will speak up if there are acts of genocide, for example. And that's probably a slight difference in the way they will actually put at risk some of the missions. Because the moment you speak up, you will not be able to operate. So I think it's a big issue. And I think that, yeah, we need to be absolutely aware of it.
Daniel Larson:
Our next question will come from Jonathan Dekel-Chen. Jonathan I'm going to allow you to talk and go ahead and ask your question.
Jonathan Dekel-Chen:
Hello, thanks very much for a fascinating presentation. I've done quite a bit of research and also publication, the world of transnational Jewish intervention intercession, humanitarian, philanthropic, political, and it all starts at around the same time as the International Committee for the Red Cross, 1850s, 1860s. I'm curious and there may not be an answer for this, but I am curious to what degree for the first hundred years or so, to what degree was there any kind of interaction or learning going on. I haven't found much evidence of it from the Jewish side of things, but I'm curious if you've seen much through the internet, through the archives in the Red Cross. Because they were working similarly, they're doing very similar things with many of the same vehicles. And it's almost surprising to me how little interaction there seemed to be from the 1860s until roughly the Second World War.
Alain Lempereur:
If we go back to Henri Dunant he is from a family of philanthropists, and I think that though he is sent as a businessman to negotiate on financial transactions, it's part of his DNA, and it's probably part of his religious upbringing. And I think that they... I make it sound that humanitarianism was born in 1859. But we all know that is not correct, right?
Alain Lempereur:
I mean, the idea that we cannot let someone die, saving a life is presented in the Torah, nearly the same, same words are found in the Quran. It is also part of the Christian tradition. So I think that there is a long tradition of, that's probably Spinoza would summarize as saying that at the end, if you take religious philosophies, all of them they amount to justice and charity, he says in his writings. And I think that it is true that coming from these different backgrounds, maybe they were running in parallel tracks without necessarily having intersected very well.
Alain Lempereur:
I think that they should be more studies today on how humanitarian is miss-shaped in different religious traditions. I'm not very familiar with that question but for sure, for example that explains why it's the Red Cross and Red Crescent. There's an entire discussion whether they should also be other religious signs and it was decided not to move in that direction. But yes, I mean certainly there are different traditions of philanthropy that put actually, you know, the first principle of humanitarian is if you go on the website of the Red Cross is the principle of humanity, saving humanity. And I think that's true in any tradition.
Daniel Larson:
Thanks very much. Our next question will come from Gary Zellerbach. Gary I'm turning on your microphone and go for it.
Gary Zellerbach:
Hello, I was wondering what teeth the Geneva Conventions have and what happens when people choose not to honor them?
Alain Lempereur:
This is a tough question, right? And I'll say, maybe I should say this off the record or on record. Well, normally the humanitarian organizations are functioning to uphold the mandate of the Geneva Conventions, right? So ICRC has received its mandate from the four Geneva Convention, and anything that goes beyond that realm is supposed to... Well, it's beyond the mandate, but that's the theory.
Alain Lempereur:
I know many humanitarians in the field who will consider that they may receive from headquarters that mandate or from the law that mandate, but then they will have to assess what's happening in the reality of the field. And I think that that's the trigger. For me it's the humanitarian trigger, that we need to analyze.
Alain Lempereur:
If we know a situation is unacceptable, whether we know it well, because we feel it's not acceptable, we will act as a humanitarian. Why do we have, you know, in the advection, you have many humanitarian diplomats who have been recognized. While not so many when you saw how many diplomats didn't do much during the Second World War, but at least you see some of these national diplomats, who suddenly say, "I know my mandate as a console in Lithuania." So that's the console [inaudible 00:54:13]. I know, my mandate says I can't help the Jews who come and ask for help, but I knew I have to, and therefore I do it. Whatever the mandate I receive from the top. Whatever the law is, it's true for the Sousa Mendes console of Portugal in the south of France, and I could give so many examples at the time.
Alain Lempereur:
At some point, the humanitarian mandate is given to you by what you see. And that's why it's really about frontline negotiation. And that's why it's so important to see what's happening. If you don't have these pictures in front of you, if you don't have these reports, you can't believe it, right? If we have not seen the images of what was happening in Wuhan or in Italy or anywhere, right? Well, what I don't see doesn't exist. And my sense of morality might therefore be limited, especially at headquarters to legality. But frontline negotiators, have a capacity somehow with the peers around them to self assign a humanitarian mandate in a situation that requires them to exercise their sense of ethics on the spot.
Daniel Larson:
Our next question comes from Karen Duca. Karen, go ahead with your question.
Alain Lempereur:
Hi, Karen, good to hear you. Because I remember we exchanged a few years ago.
Karen Duca:
Yes, definitely. I took the online negotiation course which was just spectacular. And I definitely recommend it to anyone who's listening in if you do it again. Okay, so I was really fascinated. I love to hear the history of these kinds of things to see how it evolved over time. I think we don't pay enough attention to that in any domain.
Karen Duca:
But here's what, because I'm not an expert in this particular field. As you were speaking, what was really fascinating to me is I can't imagine how these people negotiated with a gun pointed at them, and I'm impressed. So could you speak just a little bit, maybe take one of the examples and talk about how the negotiator himself perceived the challenges.
Karen Duca:
The context was very difficult, we can objectively see that. But what was in their minds? What were their fears? What did they find that hard? I think that would help me to maybe go into a more challenging situation.
Alain Lempereur:
Yeah. Karen, the model that has been prevailing in the negotiation field at Brandeis, at Harvard and in many other places, has been the interest based model, but the interest based model doesn't account for humanitarian negotiators doing their job. You can't say it's in your interest to go and risk your life negotiating with someone who has a big gun, and still people do it, right? And not only people do it, and it looks like the powerless negotiating with the powerful, but I think a lot of the work we are talking about here is to make sure that we increase the power of humanitarian negotiators.
Alain Lempereur:
And what do I mean by power? Not the power over someone, but the power of doing what has to be done. And so how do we do that? Well, in the presentation, I sense if I follows the diaries, or the accounts of many humanitarian negotiators is that first they do it because they don't even think about it. They find that natural. All of these humanitarian diplomats who broke the orders of their countries were asked afterwards, why did you do that? Why? Because, because. You see because I don't even have to run further than that.
Alain Lempereur:
Were they conscious of the risk? Absolutely. This Sousa Mendes, this console I told you about in June 1940, he sees all the refugees, many Jews coming to the Portuguese consulate. What does he realize? Well, first is he's sick. He's sick in his body, because he knows exactly what the orders are. And he asked, he has negotiated internally with his capital. And the orders came back, "No, no, no, don't help the Jews." And he was not alone, that was the case for nearly all the diplomats from nearly all the states at the time, from after the Avian Conference.
Alain Lempereur:
But so what does he do? He goes in his room, he cannot sleep, then he comes down the stairs and he said, "I know what to do. Now I will give as many visas I have to, I'll do it anyway, even if," and that happened to him, "I will have major problems when I go back home." But so it is true, that it might look sometimes that some of these negotiations are masochistic. How can we take that level of risk? Well, I guess there is a measure of well... You see take John Rabe and his colleagues. They were 800 foreigners in Nanking at the time, about 15 to 20 state. So you see, I mean, and there is no judgment on the people who leave. There are very few would say, "Well, I cannot leave my workers." That's what he said. But that's exactly also what Fritz Phillips did, and he protected his workers and even an ugly profiteer as Oscar Schindler decided he couldn't let his workers be executed.
Alain Lempereur:
So, I mean, these negotiations, they are really in extreme situations. And when you analyze also the behavior of Waldenburg it's the level of risk that most of us would not take. But it's the level of risk that people take in some of the clinics right now as nurses or doctors or they're taking immense levels of risk, right? And sometimes when we are in the field in that situation like this, we could consider, huh should I do that, I have children? I mean, is it crazy? Is it important? Well, yes, it is important because the people you save are the reason why you're doing it, right? And it's the joy of saving despite the fear and the risks of negotiating with people who are as powerful as some of these perpetrators are and where.
Alain Lempereur:
See, even think about Waldenburg, he negotiated with Schmidhuber in Budapest. Schmidhuber was the head of the Wehrmacht and he said to him either you support Eichmann here who wants to kill the remaining Jews in Budapest, finish the job as he said, or if you do that, if you support Eichmann, you will be tried after the war as a war criminal. So you better think about it. Here, it's a use of power, and it worked.
Alain Lempereur:
The same way the console of Sweden in Paris, Raoul Nordling, used the very same argument with [inaudible 01:02:06] who was sent by Hitler in that place to actually burn all the bridges and make all the monuments of Paris explode. And Raoul Nordling used arguments very similar to Waldenburg. And it was highly risky for both diplomats or for humanitarian negotiators in general to do what they're doing.
Alain Lempereur:
I think that probably what one protection they have, let me suggest this. If you are a member of the International Committee of the Red Cross or Red Crescent, if you're a member of Doctors Without Borders, or some of these UN agencies like World Food Program, or the UNHCR, UN refugee agency, somehow your vest with your organization, it's a life vest. It's a life vest that slightly protects you. It looks like perpetrators, not all of them, but they don't want to go that extra mile and not to protect that ounce of humanity that you need to protect at that time. So courage. I mean, I have my friend Jerome, who is just saying this and he is absolutely right. He is writing in the chat, courage. Yes.
Daniel Larson:
We have another question here from Damiana Andonova. Damiana you are good to go with your question.
Alain Lempereur:
Hi Damiana?
Damiana Andonova:
Hi, can you hear me?
Alain Lempereur:
Yes, absolutely. We met, right? Didn't we meet before too? In Chicago?
Damiana Andonova:
I did.
Alain Lempereur:
I see, now. Yes?
Damiana Andonova:
Yeah. I've always been very interested in this topic, even though I don't work in this topic, and I find that it's helpful in many different fields. But, really interested in your ideas about value based negotiation, interest based negotiation. This has been a very interesting topic. I think it's a very timely topic because of COVID. What are you thinking about how we can take some of these work here with how the American Red Cross has negotiated in the past and really think about how to strategize around current issues?
Damiana Andonova:
I know what's going on in Italy, obviously, in the US. A lot has been, I think I've been reading a lot about Eastern Europe, and how different minorities are treated there during the corona outbreak. What are you thinking about this crisis? And how can we take some of these lessons learned and deal with what's going on right now?
Alain Lempereur:
So just as for a next possible event, I want to tell you about a conference, an online event that we will organize next week on the COVID-19. And it will really be about the importance of cooperation. I think that all of these tools, the manner that we are talking about here for me are responsible negotiation tools. And that's right, responsible negotiation is more than interest based. It is also interest based, but it's also value based. It includes principles, like humanitarian principles for humanitarian negotiation.
Alain Lempereur:
So I think that's probably a model of negotiation that is somehow broader because it needs this other approach for that to work, but also stricter, more ethical. So a responsible negotiation approach could somehow work more broadly, but with a narrow terrain, because you can do whatever you want, because it's not simply your interest, or even the interest of the other side that you're looking for, but broader interest.
Alain Lempereur:
So why do I think that cooperation is so important? I think that what we need to continue to be better at and that's probably that was part of the idea that Henri Dunant had captured. What we need to be better at is when there is a humanitarian crisis somewhere, we need to have a global mind or minded approached like Marcel Junod and say, I'll say it in French and then I'll translate it [French language 01:07:01]. So what I mean by that is it's nothing that is human should be foreign to me. I really need to care. Even if it's a very far away.
Alain Lempereur:
Somehow this crisis showed to us that there is a new concept that is a global humanitarian crisis. In general when we thought about humanitarian crisis, "Oh, yeah, yeah. There's a humanitarian crisis in these refugee camps in that specific country," or, "There is a disaster, an earthquake in this other country." So for us, humanitarian was always something somewhere but not at home. Suddenly, and we thought, and there was denial somehow. We said, "Well, that's happening in China, but come on, it won't happen here." And then it happened in Italy and people say, "Wow, if it's happening in Italy, it could happen here." And it happened here and it may vanish, and it may be more the case now in Russia, or in Mexico, or in Brazil.
Alain Lempereur:
And I think what we start knowing is that resource mobilization are needed. Like now we have Chinese planes coming to support us. I don't think we have seen so many planes from other countries helping the Chinese when they were going through that crisis. I think that that's the global cooperation. But it's also what we see we need more national cooperation, more cooperation between federal government and the states, between the states and local officials, right?
Alain Lempereur:
So cooperation, because there's an ongoing negotiation. It could be a negotiation between the governor of New York and the President of the United States. And because it is so important, and it's because it's humanitarian, it should not be politicized. That's the last thing that should be politicized on this, and that's the principle of humanitarian aid. It's not, it's neutral and impartial in that sense that you will not want to take side. The human are... people are at stake. So you need to summon the best of negotiation, and the best of cooperation to achieve results.
Alain Lempereur:
But this is not what I see around so much. So I think they could be more of that cooperation. So next week, just for you to know we have invited everyone Jerome Kim, who is the Director General of the International Vaccine Institute. So it's a UNDP agency that is located in South Korea. And of course, it's interesting to first understand what's happening in South Korea and why maybe the kind of cooperation they've put in place might have worked better than in other places. But also interesting question to ask, Jerome is what can an institute like his do to promote cooperation to make sure that if there is a vaccine, it is not the financial logic that prevails, but the humanitarian logic that prevails.
Alain Lempereur:
The other speaker we will have next week, Mike VanRooyen the head of the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, also a doctor himself and has been involved, I've bring him up before during this crisis in Massachusetts, so it will be also interesting for him to tell us what kind of negotiations or what kind of interaction has he been part of and how can we as sometimes outsiders, what can we do to help the people in the field? But I think there is a major refocus on this aspects right now.
Daniel Larson:
We don't have very much time left but, Alain are you okay with one more question?
Alain Lempereur:
I take one more question, and as I answer them, I'm going to the... I'll share with you the poster. So I think the question. Go ahead.
Daniel Larson:
Great. So we have a question here from Jill Hoffman. Jill, you are good to go with your question.
Jill Hofmann:
Hi. I'm here from California.
Alain Lempereur:
Hi Jill?
Jill Hofmann:
I teach International Humanitarian Law for the Red Cross.
Alain Lempereur:
Yes.
Jill Hofmann:
I have a question for you because I had the opportunity in 1993, '94. I was doing the Rwandan crisis. Let me see, can you hear me?
Daniel Larson:
Jill you have two accounts open I think, so we're hearing an echo from yourself. You can mute one.
Jill Hofmann:
Yeah, let me close one. Can you hear me now?
Alain Lempereur:
Yes, go ahead Jill.
Jill Hofmann:
In any case I had the opportunity of debriefing Rwandan delegates who were coming back from the fields during the Rwandan fiasco. And I think it means something other than what you mentioned in terms of debriefing delegates. It was the psychosocial aspect of what they went through. And I'm wondering if that's still happening. It happened in the 90s, we did it but then it was a one time and they've never done it before John Pier Ravel from the ICRC and I did it. And I'm wondering if that's continued on as part of the process of taking care of the ICRC delegates who are always working in challenges in the field.
Alain Lempereur:
Yes, I think that for sure this PTSD is an aspect that the ICRC has been working on for decades. I think that for sure if there's more learning about humanitarian negotiation for the last five years, but the capacity to support staff who have gone through trauma is something probably that some of these humanitarian organization have been doing have been good at doing. And I think that's probably another aspect that we really need to think about during this COVID-19 crisis. Is that health workers as we know have a hard life in general. And it goes from a hard life to a hell of a life, a hellish life now.
Alain Lempereur:
And I think that going from normal difficulties to humanitarian difficulties as today requires this level of debriefing, psychological debriefing you're talking about. I think that, I mean today, we are talking about people suffering from the COVID-19. But there are also a lot of people more and more people who suffer psychologically from it and health workers more than others.
Alain Lempereur:
I have seen some pictures as I was preparing for this talk of health workers who are in tears, and I think that's what you describe, from what you've done with the delegates who were in tears, who at least terribly traumatized who were in Rwanda. By the way, if you're interested there is a very good documentary, that is called Triage, that was done about the missions of Doctors Without Borders in both Somalia and Rwanda. And I think that you have a very powerful negotiation scenes in that documentary, but I think that you could see how hard it is for people who have been there to return to these places that are associated to trauma. And I think we need to be prepared for that too.
Alain Lempereur:
And certainly negotiators are going through, frontliners whether they're from humanitarian organizations or frontliners in general, have a big suffering psychologically speaking, that needs to be addressed. And we are better at doing it today as we have been with the veterans, also that we used to be as we see how Vietnam veterans were treated.
Daniel Larson:
So Alain thank you so much for your time. And Jill, thank you for your final question there. We're wrapping up here. We reached the end of our time, but Alain thank you again so much for taking the time out of your day and I know you want to show information on an upcoming event. Just want to express our appreciation on behalf of the University Alumni Association for you taking the time to give this presentation to our broader alumni community.
Alain Lempereur:
Daniel, can I show them, can I show for a second the announcement for the online panel that we're organizing on May 8th? And so if you are interested in this panel, don't hesitate to sign up. We will make also the link available to Brandeis alumni and friends. Thanks Daniel and Sharon for organizing this.
Daniel Larson:
Thank you, everyone. Thank you, Alain and everyone have a great day. Thanks for joining us and we hope to see you at a future Brandeis program.
Alain Lempereur:
Thank you guys.
Daniel Larson:
Stay healthy. Bye-bye.
Alain Lempereur:
You too. Bye-bye, guys. Take care.